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Selected Issues in the Rise 
of Income Inequality
INCREASED AMERICAN INCOME INEQUALITY, in particular the increased
skewness at the very top of the income distribution, has received enormous
attention. This paper surveys three aspects of rising inequality that are usu-
ally discussed separately: inequality within the bottom 90 percent, inequality
within the top 10 percent, and international differences in inequality, par-
ticularly among top earners.
We begin by examining data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) on income ratios between the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles, both
for men and women separately and for the two sexes combined. We then
examine several proposed explanations of changes in relative incomes
within the bottom 90 percent, including the impacts of unions, free trade,
immigration, the real minimum wage, and top-bracket tax rates. We also
assess the hypothesis that the primary driver of increased inequality is
skill-biased technological change.
We then tackle the most controversial issue, namely, why American
incomes at the very top have increased so much, both relative to incomes
below the 90th percentile in this country and relative to top incomes in
Europe and Japan.






We are grateful for superb research assistance from two Northwestern undergraduates,
Bobby Krenn and Neil Sarkar, and for helpful comments from David Autor, Polly Cleve-
land, Xavier Gabaix, James Heckman, and Lawrence Katz. This is a drastically shortened
version of a complete survey soon to be available as a National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper.
1. Our initial work on inequality (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005) explains the gap
between the growth of mean and the growth of median labor income.
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whose compensation also appears market driven but not ampliﬁed by access
to a mass audience, and corporate executives, whose incomes are arguably
not market driven but who instead can manipulate their pay to their own
advantage. Our examination of cross-country differences ﬁnds that inequality
at the top has increased more in the United States and the United Kingdom
than in continental Europe, for what seems to be a combination of reasons.
Facts about the Bottom 90 Percent
Our 2005 Brookings Paper reported that during 1966–2001 only the
top 10 percent of the income distribution enjoyed gains in real wage and
salary income equal to or above the economy-wide rate of productivity
growth.
2 Accordingly, here we analyze the lower 90 percent of the income
distribution separately from the top 10 percent. Drawing the line at the
90th percentile is convenient: the widely used CPS data apply best to
income groups at and below that threshold, since top-coding limits what
the CPS data can tell us about income shifts within the top 10 percent.
Much of the literature on changes below the 90th percentile emphasizes
their exact timing. The top panel of ﬁgure 1, which depicts average hourly
wage trends for men and women combined, shows differences in timing
when different points in the distribution are compared: the ratio of wages at
the 90th percentile to that at the 50th (the 90-50 ratio) increases more or less
steadily after 1979, whereas the 50-10 ratio shows a sharp increase during
1980–86 followed by a slow and partial reversal. The 90-10 ratio, which
combines these trends, shows a distinct increase between 1980 and 1988 fol-
lowed by a plateau at a level between 20 and 25 percent above that of 1979.
3
However, the depiction of trends for both sexes combined blurs some
sharp differences in the patterns for men and women taken separately. For
men (middle panel of ﬁgure 1), the 50-10 ratio has returned by 1998 to its
1979 level, after a temporary jump in 1979–86. Meanwhile the 90-50 ratio
increases at almost a constant rate, rising 14 percentage points between 1979
and 1990 and another 11 percentage points between 1990 and 2005. The data
for women (bottom panel) are more surprising. Their 90-50 ratio follows the
170 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
2. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005).
3. Data are from the State of Working America database at the Economic Policy Institute
website (www.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabﬁg.html).
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Economic Policy Institute.
a. Ratio of average hourly wages at the 90th percentile of the distribution to that at the 10th.
Figure 1. Changes in Ratios of Average Hourly Wages at Various Percentiles of the
Distribution, 1973–2005
a
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the increase is sustained. This is consistent with the fact that women are
roughly twice as likely to be paid the minimum wage as men.
4 Perhaps
most surprising is that the overall increase in the 90-10 ratio for women is
almost double the increase for men: 44 log percentage points versus 23.
All of the numbers just cited understate the overall increase in inequality,
because much of that increase has occurred within the top 10 percent of
the income distribution. As our 2005 paper documented using Internal
Revenue Service data,
5 an important distinction should be made between
income at the 90th percentile and the average income within the top decile,
because increased skewness within that decile makes average income rise
faster than 90th-percentile income. We showed that half of the total rise of
inequality over 1966–2001 represents the higher 90-10 ratio discussed
above, and the other half represents increased skewness within the top
decile.
6 We return to the issue of top-decile inequality later in the paper.
Institutions and the Bottom 90 Percent
To understand what has inﬂuenced the income distribution below the
90th percentile, we begin with the three factors stressed by Claudia Goldin
and Robert Margo as sources of their 1940–70 “Great Compression,” namely,
the rise of unionization, the decline of international trade, and the decline of
immigration.
7 These factors convincingly explain the reduction in inequality
among the bottom 90 percent during 1940–70, and their reversal explains
much of the increased inequality after 1970. Later we examine the effect of
changes in the real minimum wage and other types of institutional change.
The share of U.S. employees belonging to unions declined rapidly from
27 percent in 1979 to 19 percent in 1986, and then more slowly to 14 percent
in 2005.
8 Since the real minimum wage was declining at approximately
the same time, it is difﬁcult to distinguish empirically between those two
factors in accounting for the rise in the 50-10 income ratio. David Card,
Thomas Lemieux, and Craig Riddell ﬁnd that the decline in unionization
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
4. See Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006).
5. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005, p. 113).
6. Piketty and Saez (2003) also provide a detailed analysis of the top quantiles.
7. Goldin and Margo (1992).
8. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007, ﬁgure 3W, p. 182).
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wages between 1973 and 2001 and none of the increased variance of female
wages. This supports Richard Freeman’s earlier ﬁnding that unions tend to
reduce wage inequality among men (but not women), because the inequality-
increasing “between-sector” effect is smaller than the dispersion-reducing
“within-sector” effect.
9 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Alle-
gretto concur with Card, Lemieux, and Riddell and the previous literature
in ﬁnding that unions’ effect in raising wages and beneﬁts is greatest at
the middle of the income distribution relative to the top and bottom, and
that this effect is strongest for high school graduates.
10
The ratio of imports to U.S. GDP increased from 5.4 percent in 1970 to
16.2 percent in 2005. Several researchers, including Almas Heshmati and
Tracy Miller,
11 argue that unskilled labor embodied in imports is a substi-
tute for domestic unskilled labor, and that the growing import-GDP ratio
since 1970 has contributed to the lower relative wages for unskilled workers
observed since 1979. Thus far, however, we have not found in the literature
any quantitative estimate of the import effect.
Annual immigration (legal and illegal) as a share of the U.S. population
increased steadily from 0.13 percent in 1960 to 0.41 percent in 2002.
12
Immigration has accounted for more than half of total U.S. labor force growth
overthepastdecade,
13andtheshareofforeign-bornworkersinthelaborforce
has grown steadily from 5.3 percent in 1970 to 14.7 percent in 2005.
14 Since
1990 foreign-born workers have outnumbered African American workers.
15
A large and controversial literature studies the effect of immigration on
the wages of native-born workers. A set of papers by George Borjas argues
that immigration reduced real wages for native-born workers from 1980 to
2000 by about 3 percent,
16 and by almost 9 percent for native-born workers
without a high school diploma.
17
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9. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004); Freeman (1980).
10. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007).
11. Heshmati (2007); Miller (2001).
12. Gordon (2003, p. 268).
13. Orrenius and Zavodny (2006).
14. Ottaviano and Peri (2006, p. 1).
15. See Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007, ﬁgure 10).
16. Borjas (2003, 2006); Borjas and Katz (2005).
17. Borjas (2003, table IX, p. 1369). Williamson (2006) provides an intriguing analogy
to the late nineteenth century, when the ﬂow of immigrants into the United States raised
inequality here but the outﬂow from Scandinavia reduced inequality there.
10922-10a_Gordon.qxd  1/25/08  11:24 AM  Page 173Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri make a novel point about immi-
gration.
18 Low-skilled immigrants disproportionately enter occupations
already staffed by foreign-born workers (such as restaurant work and land-
scape services), and thus their main impact is to drive down the wages of
other foreign-born workers, not native-born workers. It had previously been
noted that, among high school dropouts, the wages of native- and foreign-
born workers were almost identical up to 1980, but by 2004 foreign-born
workers were earning 15 to 20 percent less. This had previously been
interpreted as evidence of a declining skill level among new immigrants,
but Ottaviano and Peri claim that this shift is consistent with their inter-
pretation of increased competition of immigrants with each other in those
job classiﬁcations in which they specialize.
There is a contentious literature on the effects of the minimum wage on
employment, but less evidence on its effect on wage inequality. Mishel,
Bernstein, and Allegretto report that the real minimum wage declined (in
2005 dollars) from $7.23 to $5.09 between 1979 and 1989, then rose in
two steps to $6.25 in 1997 before falling back to $5.15 in 2005. The decline
in the minimum wage in proportion to the average hourly earnings of pro-
duction and nonsupervisory workers over the same period was more gradual,
from 45 percent in 1979 to 31 percent in 2005.
19
Card and John DiNardo advocate the hypothesis that the erosion of
the real minimum wage accounts for much of the increase of inequality
as represented by the 90-10 ratio.
20 They ﬁnd an almost perfect negative
correlation between the decline in the real minimum wage and the increase
in the 90-10 ratio, as most of these co-movements were concentrated in
the 1980–86 period. However, as noted above, at the same time that the
minimum wage was falling, other institutional changes were occurring
that likely also affected inequality.
A possible weakness in the minimum wage story is that, as the bottom
panel of ﬁgure 1 showed, the female 50-10 ratio did not respond at all to the
increase in the real minimum wage from 1989 to 1997 or to its subsequent
decline, even though, as noted above, women are more likely to be paid the
minimum wage. This throws doubt on whether the minimum wage is the sin-
gle factor explaining the large increase in 50-10 inequality in the early 1980s.
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
18. Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
19. Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007, pp. 190–95).
20. Card and DiNardo (2002).
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is due, at least in part, to the declining bargaining power and coverage of
unions, to the increased importance of imports and immigration, and to the
decrease in the real minimum wage. Frank Levy and Peter Temin provide
a complementary interpretation that places more emphasis on a change in
political philosophy from what they call the “Detroit consensus” of the
late 1940s to the Reagan-initiated “Washington consensus” of the early
1980s.
21 The main point that Levy and Temin add is that highly progres-
sive taxes, with 90 percent marginal tax rates for top-bracket earners in
the 1940s and 1950s, sent a signal that very high incomes were socially
unacceptable. Further, high marginal tax rates limited the rate at which
the very rich could accumulate capital income. Beginning with the Reagan
tax cuts, that element of the policy support of the Great Compression began
to erode.
Skill-Biased Technological Change
Thus far the timing seems to support major roles for declining union-
ization (for men over 1980–86) and a declining real minimum wage (for
women over 1980–89) in the rise in the 50-10 ratio. The next puzzle to be
resolved is the source of the gradual steady increase in the 90-50 ratio for
both men and women throughout the post-1979 period.
A central unifying hypothesis in the labor economics literature on
inequality is the role of skill-biased technological change (SBTC), which
was initially based on a simple model in which two skill classes of labor
are imperfect substitutes.
22 Because both the relative quantity of college
graduates and the relative wage they receive have increased since 1970, the
SBTC hypothesis argues that employer demand must have shifted toward
more-skilled workers.
A consistent theme of the SBTC literature is that the 90-50 ratio has
increased markedly since the 1970s but that the 50-10 ratio has increased
little if at all. We have already seen that this statement is accurate for men
but not for women. At least for men, whatever skills SBTC favors must be
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21. Levy and Temin (2007).
22. See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992) and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991);
Card and DiNardo (2002) provide an extensive review of the literature.
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then, and what the SBTC literature has sometimes been vague about, is the
nature of the skills that favor those at the 90th percentile and above but
are lacking at, say, the 70th percentile and below.
David Autor, Katz, and Melissa Kearney,
23 building on earlier work by
Autor, Richard Murnane, and Levy,
24 adopt a three-way distinction among
nonroutine cognitive work (including that of CEOs, lawyers, investment
bankers, professors, and doctors), routine repetitive work (bookkeepers,
accountants), and manual interactive work (truck drivers, nurses, waiters).
This distinction emphasizes that work at the top and the bottom is inherently
interactive and thus less prone to outsourcing than the noninteractive
middle jobs. SBTC has increased the demand for people in the top group,
while trade allows ﬁrms to substitute away from domestic workers in the
middle group. The increased demand for skilled workers has also driven
up college wage premia, because of reduced growth in the relative supply
of college workers.
25
Increased Inequality at the Top
We now turn to the phenomenon of increased skewness within the
top decile. We introduce a three-way distinction among superstars in the
sports and entertainment industries; high-paid, high-skilled workers, such
as lawyers and investment bankers, who lack the audience-magnifying
properties of superstars; and the controversial additional category of CEOs
and other top corporate managers.
In his 1981 paper on the economics of superstars,
26 Sherwin Rosen
explained the extreme skewness in certain occupational categories (primar-
ily those involving public performance) in terms of particular characteristics
of their demand and supply. On the demand side, audiences want to see
the very best talent, not the second-best, and so the ability of top super-
stars to ﬁll large entertainment venues and to sell recordings is an order of
magnitude higher than that of second-best stars. On the supply side, the
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
23. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005).
24. Autor, Murnane, and Levy (2003).
25. For a more complete discussion of college wage premia, see Goldin and Katz, this
volume.
26. Rosen (1981).
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mance. Together these considerations give rise to a wage premium for
superstars.
The superstar premium reﬂects a particular type of SBTC. Rosen sug-
gested that a succession of innovations going back to the phonograph
increased the size of audiences who can experience a given performance
and thus increased the incomes of superstars by many multiples. The sharp
further increase in superstar incomes since Rosen’s article reflects the
further development of technology, including cable television, rentable
videotapes and DVDs, and downloadable music.
The high incomes of our second group likewise reﬂect the operation of
market forces. Workers in certain prestigious professions, especially top-
rank lawyers and investment bankers, earn incomes that are determined
by market demand for the services provided by their firms, whether an
enormous law ﬁrm like Chicago’s Sidley Austin or an investment bank
like Goldman Sachs. Unlike with superstars, however, the work product
of these professionals is not distributed to a mass audience by electronic
media. They are still tied down by the need to meet in person with clients
or to personally attend legal proceedings with adversaries.
Robert Frank and Philip Cook provide a uniﬁed analysis of these two
groups.
27 They begin with sports and entertainment stars, where a clear
deﬁnition of “winning” translates into disproportionate pay premia. Their
main contribution beyond Rosen is to broaden the context of the tournament
and the deﬁnition of success. Frank and Cook argue that certain leading
“brands” dominate some professions in the same way that popular prod-
uct brands and their extensions (Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios, for example)
dominate shelf space in supermarkets. They thus extend the context of
superstars to “law, journalism, consulting, medicine, investment banking,
corporate management, publishing, design, fashion, and even the hallowed
halls of academe.”
Although Frank and Cook include “corporate management” among the
winners in their winner-take-all paradigm, we treat top corporate ofﬁcers
separately. We distinguish this group because an ample literature indicates
that CEO pay is not set purely on the market, but rather by collusion among
peer CEOs who sit on each other’s compensation committees.
28
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28. See Murphy (1999) for a review of this literature.
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favor of a managerial power hypothesis that drives top executive pay
well above the market solution.
29 This is supported by the finding of
Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein that among the top five corporate officers
in each of the firms in the S&P 1,500 index, pay increased by almost
twice as much between 1993 and 2003 as a set of standard market vari-
ables, including sales, return on assets, and the market return on the ﬁrm’s
stock, could explain.
30 The ratio of top-five compensation to corporate
proﬁts among these ﬁrms rose from 5.0 percent in 1993–95 to 12.8 percent
in 2000–02.
31
Bebchuk and Grinstein’s work is subject to two major criticisms. First,
for their empirical model to make sense, the factors that determine the cross
section of CEO pay must also have the same effects as pay changes over
time. Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier have argued that the cross
section and the time series need not behave identically.
32 Second, execu-
tives likely care about share prices, not proﬁts, because during the 1980s
the share of top executive pay taking the form of stock options rose from
40 percent to 70 percent. If share prices rose faster than proﬁts over the
period they examined (that is, if the price-earnings ratio rose), then the
ratio of executive pay to market capitalization would have increased less
than the ratio of pay to proﬁts. In fact, the price-earnings ratio of the S&P
500 rose only a modest 16 percent over the Bebchuk-Grinstein interval of
1993–2003.
33 One must look earlier to ﬁnd large increases in the price-
earnings ratio. (It doubled between 1990 and 1999.) Since price-earnings
ratios clearly did increase enormously during much of the big run-up in
executive pay in the 1980s and 1990s, it is worth considering the simple
equilibrium explanation of Gabaix and Landier that executive pay moves
in proportion to market capitalization.
178 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
29. Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
30. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005).
31. Kaplan and Rauh (2007) point out that much of the high income is earned by lawyers
and investment bankers, not just CEOs. However, they minimize the importance of CEOs
and Wall Street pay by dividing through by adjusted gross income rather than W-2 income,
which was the focus of our 2005 study of the growth of skewness in labor income. This
debate is beyond the scope of this paper, as it involves such issues as the fact that lawyers
report their earnings as partnership (proprietors’) income, not as W-2 income.
32. Gabaix and Landier (forthcoming).
33. Using the price-earnings ratio calculated as the inverse of the earnings-to-price
ratio for the S&P 500, from Economic Report of the President 2006, table B-95.
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for ﬁrm size and CEO talent. Their stunning result is that the time-series
elasticity of average CEO pay to aggregate stock market capitalization is
predicted to be exactly unity: “The sixfold increase of CEO pay between
1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the sixfold increase in market cap-
italization of large US companies during that period.” They also derive a
superstar effect, in that “a very small dispersion in CEO talent . . . justiﬁes
large pay differences.”
34
One reason for skepticism is that the authors’ own data do not support a
unitary elasticity. Their ﬁgure 1 shows that, over 1970–2000, their preferred
“JMW” index of executive compensation increased 22-fold while market
capitalization increased roughly 8-fold.
35 More troublingly, the results
that drive the Gabaix-Landier hypothesis do not hold before 1970. Carola
Frydman and Raven Saks study executive compensation going back to
1936.
36 They run regressions similar to those of Gabaix and Landier to ﬁnd
the elasticity of CEO compensation to both own-ﬁrm and average-ﬁrm
size. They conﬁrm the result from Gabaix and Landier, and from Rosen,
37
that the cross-sectional elasticity of CEO pay with respect to firm size 
is 0.3. But they reject the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity between CEO
pay and average ﬁrm size, instead ﬁnding an elasticity closer to 0.1 for
most of their sample, both including and excluding the Great Depression
and World War II.
We also tried to replicate Gabaix and Landier’s result for 1970–2005.
Rather than simply taking the entire period as one regression sample, how-
ever, we ran rolling twenty-year regressions to see how the compensation–
ﬁrm size elasticity might have changed over time. Figure 2 plots the results,
which show a large rise in the point estimate over time, from approximately
0.5 to 1.5. So a unit elasticity does not seem to be an accurate description
of CEO pay even for 1980–2005.
Nevertheless, one thing that is clear is that the relationship between
ﬁrm size and CEO pay has not been stable over time, and this leads to two
possible conclusions. First, it may be that no connection exists between
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34. Gabaix and Landier (forthcoming, abstract).
35. According to their ﬁgure 1, the 1970 and 2000 observations for the JMW index are
0.5 and 11, respectively, whereas the numbers for market capitalization are 0.8 and 6.7.
36. Frydman and Saks (2007).
37. Rosen (1992).
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guided. If the distribution of ﬁrm size is separate from more structural
factors such as the aggregate capital stock, one might not expect to ﬁnd
any relationship between ﬁrm size and CEO pay. On the other hand, if the
average ﬁrm grows at precisely the same rate as the average quantity of
capital per worker—for example, if the number of workers per ﬁrm tends
to be stable—then one would expect to see a strong correlation between
average ﬁrm size and the pay of every employee.
Bebchuk and Fried provide substantial evidence that the principal-
agent setting alone cannot explain the salient facts about CEO pay.
38 They
propose an alternative model in which CEOs have control over boards
of directors and are mainly restricted by an “outrage constraint,” whereby
shareholders retaliate if they perceive executive compensation to be exces-
sive. The key assumption of the standard principal-agent situation, that
180 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
38. Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
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Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Each year on the horizontal axis is the final year of a twenty-year rolling regression; dotted lines indicate ± 2 robust standard 
errors; variables are taken from Gabaix and Landier (forthcoming, table 2). 
Figure 2. Results of Rolling Regressions of CEO Compensation on Firm Size,
1990–2004
a
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with, their pay is far from negligible—an average of $152,000 a year in the
top 200 ﬁrms. Although directors also usually own stock in the companies
they oversee, presumably they stand to gain less from good governance
than the salary they would lose if they were not renominated. Moreover,
directors often receive substantial nonsalary beneﬁts in the form of perks,
or in business directed to their own ﬁrms. As already noted, if a CEO is also
on the boards of any of his or her directors, there are ample opportunities
for tit-for-tat relationships.
Bebchuk and Fried provide ample evidence that ﬁrms work to disguise
the magnitude of CEO pay.
39 If contracts were optimal, ﬁrms would have
no reason to try to hide what their CEOs earn. But if instead ﬁrms are bound
only by an outrage constraint, they will have every reason to hide that infor-
mation. This type of camouﬂage is available because the ﬁnancial press
generally reports only annual salary compensation, ignoring deferred
compensation and beneﬁts.
One of the most salient features of the recent run-up in executive
compensation is the use of stock options. Brian Hall and Jeffrey Liebman
propose two alternative explanations for the dramatic increase in the use of
options; like much of the above analysis, they test a market-driven account
against a managerial power story.
40 The ﬁrst explanation is that corporate
boards want to strengthen the relationship between pay and performance.
This echoes the argument that the optimal set of incentives would not be tied
exclusively to market performance. The second explanation, complementary
to the ﬁrst, is that boards want to increase CEO pay regardless of perfor-
mance and choose options as a “less visible” form of compensation that is
less likely to incite stockholder anger.
International Comparisons
Perhaps the most challenging facts to be explained rest in the raw inter-
national data on inequality at the top as summarized by Thomas Piketty and
Emmanuel Saez and analyzed by Anthony Atkinson.
41 Figure 3 summarizes
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39. Murphy (2002) provides some criticism of this proposition.
40. Hall and Liebman (1998).
41. Piketty and Saez (2006a, 2006b); Atkinson (2007).
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of the top 1 percent over the period since 1920 in Canada, France, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. (Here income includes labor,
business, and capital income but excludes capital gains.)
The contrast between the United States and the other countries in recent
years could not be more dramatic. The income share of the top 1 percent
of the U.S. distribution traces out a distinct U-shaped pattern over time,
with a high of 8.2 percent reached in 1928, then a slide to a minimum of
1.9 percent reached in 1973, followed by a steady increase to 7.3 percent
in 2000. Japan’s performance differs the most from the U.S. pattern: there
the share of the top 1 percent has remained stable since 1947 at around
2.0 percent. Shares in the other countries range widely, but all (except Canada
briefly) remain above 5 percent between 1920 and 1938, falling to about
2 percent between 1960 and 1980. The upsurge in the top income share
after 1980 was led by the remarkable increase in the U.S. ratio, followed
by Canada and the United Kingdom, which appear to mimic the U.S. per-
formance with an elasticity of between 0.3 and 0.5. Meanwhile the top share
182 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007










1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1925
Source: Piketty and Saez (2006b).






Figure 3. Share of the Top 1 Percent in Total Income in Selected Industrial Countries,
1920–2000
a
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of great importance in assessing the behavior of inequality on both sides
of the Atlantic.
Other data applying to the entire distribution, not just the top 1 percent,
support the view that inequality is higher in the United States than in the
rest of the developed world.
42 Thomas Harjes ﬁnds, however, that the Gini
coefficient rose more in the United Kingdom than in the United States
between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, and that the increase was sub-
stantial in Germany and Spain but was zero in Italy and slightly negative
in France.
43 Harjes thus paints a picture not of a sharp contrast between
the United States and everyone else, but of a high degree of heterogeneity.
He also points out that labor’s income share has fallen by 6 to 10 percentage
points in most European countries but has remained stable in the United
States. Since capital income tends to be more concentrated than labor
income, this can mechanically increase inequality.
One approach taken by Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto and by others
to explain the high relative level and growth of inequality in the United
States is to ﬁnd factors in the socio-politico-economic “system” that differ-
entiate the United States from other developed countries.
44 Yet, as Harjes
notes,
45 this “American exceptionalism” approach misses the heterogeneity
in the level and growth of inequality outside the United States. It may be
that countries have adopted a variety of models using different combinations
of policies and institutions. For example, the “consensus model” adopted
in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Sweden, Ireland, and Germany,
obtained moderation in wage demands in return in some cases for reduced
income taxes, and in other cases with the expectation that managers would
avoid seeking excessive compensation increases. In Germany executive
compensation is held down by such institutional features as the two-tier
company board with strong labor representation, “legal co-determination
rights,” and a high tax rate on capital gains from stock options.
46
Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein ﬁnd a joint relationship between
inequality and general institutional quality.
47 Using panel data from a large
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10922-10a_Gordon.qxd  1/25/08  11:24 AM  Page 183set of countries over twenty years, they ﬁnd that inequality drives future
institutional quality—a result obtained by numerous other researchers
48—
but also that institutions in turn drive future inequality. This relationship
holds for a variety of measures of institutions, including indexes of civil
liberties, political rights, government stability, corruption, and rule of law.
49
At the very top level of incomes plotted in ﬁgure 3, Piketty and Saez point
out that the divergence between the English-speaking countries and the
others occurs only in labor income, not capital income, as the “working rich”
have replaced the “rentiers.”
50 They propose three broad classes of expla-
nations. The ﬁrst is SBTC favoring people at the top, but they note that
technological changes have been similar everywhere whereas top income
shares have not. The second class includes changes in regulations, unions,
and social norms, a view that they claim implies that “the surge in executive
compensation actually represents valuable efﬁciency gains.”
51 The third
class is the U.S. managerial power explanation that we associated above
with Bebchuk and coauthors, namely, “the increased ability of executives
to set their own pay and extract rents at the expense of shareholders.”
52
We favor a blend of all three explanations. We see the market at work
in the increase of market capitalization in the United States spilling over
into executive compensation through the greater use of stock options here
than in other countries. We supported the managerial power view in our
summary of Bebchuk’s work above. And we have summarized several
institutional differences that we believe have an impact.
The greater use of stock options to reward executives in the United States
than in other countries itself reﬂects institutional differences. Some of these
involve differences in the taxing of stock options.
53 In Germany only half
of the companies in the leading stock market index have any stock option
program at all.
54 And until 1997 stock options were illegal in Japan, except
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48. For example, Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Hoff
and Stiglitz (2004), and Sonin (2003).
49. Chong and Gradstein (2007) also provide a concise review of the rather small liter-
ature on institutions and inequality.
50. Piketty and Saez (2006a, 2006b).
51. Piketty and Saez (2006b, p. 7).
52. Piketty and Saez (2006b, p. 7).
53. Tom Buerkle, “Stock Options, Once Derided, Catch on in Europe,” International
Herald Tribune, April 5, 2000.
54. Eric Pfanner, “Pay Plans Get Review after Microsoft Shift: In Europe, a New Look
at Options,” International Herald Tribune, July 10, 2003.
10922-10a_Gordon.qxd  1/25/08  11:24 AM  Page 184at small start-up companies. Restrictions were loosened in 2001, but major
Japanese companies adopted stock options only with a long lag, following
decades of tradition in which executive pay was many multiples less rela-
tive to average worker pay than in the United States.
55 This may have held
down inequality in Japan.
In short, we see no single dominant explanation for the increase in CEO
pay in the United States relative to other developed countries. Price-earnings
ratios increased more here than elsewhere, at least through 2000, and this,
together with the widespread and growing use of stock options, caused
stock market gains to spill over into CEO pay. To some extent the lesser use
of stock options abroad represents a catch-up phenomenon, with European
companies adopting U.S. practices after a lag of one or two decades.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the increase in American inequality since 1970
at the bottom, middle, and top of the income distribution. We distinguished
between the rise in inequality outside the top 10 percent, as measured by
the 90-10 income ratio, and in inequality within the top 10 percent. We
suggested that roughly half of the total increase in inequality since 1966
reﬂects the 90th percentile gaining relative to the 10th percentile, and that
the other half has occurred within the top 10th percentile, particularly the
top 1 percent.
For the 90-10 ratio we found a role for a reversal of the Goldin-Margo
“Great Compression” and the Levy-Temin “Detroit consensus.” Eroding
union power, increasing imports, increasing immigration, a decreasing real
minimum wage, and a decline in top-bracket tax rates have all played a role,
in different magnitudes at different times since 1975. For the 90-50 ratio we
endorsed the effort by Autor and coauthors to broaden the skills distinction
to three or more categories; their polarization hypothesis also makes a lot
of sense in explaining the facts about rising inequality and the occupa-
tions most prone to outsourcing.
We reviewed the ample evidence that SBTC is a major explanation of
increased skewness of labor incomes at the top. We distinguished three
Robert J. Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker 185
55. Brian Bremner, “The Stock-Option Option Comes to Japan,” Business Week, April
19, 1999.
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members of any performance occupation; here the magniﬁcation of audi-
ences provides disproportionate rewards to the very best compared with
the second-best. A second category of top incomes is also market-driven
and includes partners in law ﬁrms, investment bankers, and hedge fund
managers; for this category there is no obvious analogy to audience 
magniﬁcation.
The most contentious question concerns the sources of the enormous
increase in the United States, but not in Europe or Japan, in the ratio of
top executive compensation to average worker compensation. The core
distinction among the three categories is that incomes in the ﬁrst two are
chosen by the market, whereas the compensation of executives is chosen
largely by their peers in a system that gives them and their hand-picked
boards of directors, rather than the market, control over incomes. We endorse
Bebchuk and Fried’s idea that managerial power lies behind some of the
outsized gains in CEO pay. By enriching the principal-agent model, they
provide a much more realistic model of the interactions among shareholders,
boards, and executives.
Some of the most interesting remaining issues involve cross-country dif-
ferences, and here some of the most interesting explanations involve differ-
ences in institutions. These include different governance structures for top
executives and differences in the use of stock options as executive com-
pensation. There is also evidence that, in countries with a long history of
tax progressivity, highly redistributive systems persist. Researchers also
have found that low inequality feeds back into high-quality institutions,
creating, at least for those who favor greater equality, a virtuous cycle.
The study of income inequality is of fundamental importance to eco-
nomics for several reasons. The most obvious is that if economics is at all
concerned with understanding the development of economies over time,
we must understand not only changes in means, but also changes in distri-
butions. Second, changes in inequality can be indicative of changes in the
structure of the economy (such as SBTC) that may favor one group or
another. Third, variation in inequality can indicate how well the various
theories about risk sharing and consumption smoothing actually ﬁt with
experience. Fourth, one can learn about the effects of various institutions on
inequality by studying the experiences of different countries, thus allowing
better-informed policy choices. What those choices should be, however,
lies beyond the reach of this paper.
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General Discussion
Bradford DeLong wondered whether inequality mattered less today for life
expectancy, health status, access to culture, and human capital development
than it did in the “ﬁrst gilded age.” Similarly, Lawrence Katz observed that
rising inequality today is not caused by poorer people becoming worse off,
but by poor people becoming better off at a slower pace than rich people.
Reported job satisfaction and subjective well-being display similar trends.
Lawrence Summers questioned the idea that corporate governance prob-
lems are leading to CEOs being paid more than their market value. He
suggested that leveraged buyout ﬁrms presumably do not pay more than
necessary to attract the CEOs they want, and yet more CEOs seem to
want to move from public ﬁrms to these privately held ﬁrms than vice
versa. Summers also noted a variety of difﬁculties in correctly measuring
the incomes of highly paid individuals. For example, the increasing money
income of CEOs may overstate the true rise in their compensation, as declin-
ing tax rates would have induced substitution from fringe beneﬁts to money
income. In addition, a substantial amount of hedge fund managers’ compen-
sation is invested in the fund and recorded as labor income on a deferred
basis only when the investment is sold. Moreover, successful entrepreneurs
can choose how to structure their compensation—as labor income or as
capital income—and this choice is probably sensitive to income tax laws.
Alan Krueger referred to the work of Kevin Hallock regarding man-
agerial compensation and overlapping boards. Hallock found no evidence
that  having overlapping compensation committees raises executive pay.
Krueger also suggested removing payments to retired workers from calcu-
lations of earnings inequality. Data on earnings often include employer
outlays for pensions and retiree health care, the latter of which have been
rising rapidly. However, those particular increases may not reﬂect increases
10922-10b_Gordon Discussion.qxd  1/25/08  11:25 AM  Page 191in the marginal product of current workers or be perceived by current
workers as increases in compensation.
William Nordhaus said that compensation in the ﬁnancial sector seems
to involve various inefﬁciencies and that these inefﬁciencies may take a
long time to erode. He drew an analogy with the high fees of many mutual
funds, which have outraged analysts for as long as he could remember but
persist to this day.
Martin Baily proposed two hypotheses for the dramatic increase in
executive compensation. One is that markets are failing: boards are not
adequately monitoring CEO behavior. Another is that markets are being
revealed: CEOs are paid what they are worth, which is more than they were
worth before. Baily thought that the truth probably contains elements of
both hypotheses. Since its early years the United States has evolved from a
highly entrepreneurial economy to a more institutional economy in which
it is more difficult to run a successful corporation. As a result, the value
of a CEO is perhaps higher today, which is why CEOs are paid more. In
Europe, by contrast, there is less capital and labor mobility, and the marginal
product of CEOs is lower; in addition, unions are much stronger in Europe, so
marginal products are not fully reﬂected in compensation. The United States
can either institute stronger tax and transfer programs to curb inequality, or
accept the outcome the market has produced.
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